Last night, a joint force from America’s Tier One special operations command conducted a raid on a pirate camp in Somalia, freeing two hostages – an American and a Dane – and killing their captors before exfiltrating north to Djibouti via helicopter. USA Today ‘s lead paragraph captures the mission well, while also serving as the best recruiting pitch for the Navy’s Sea, Air, and Land teams that I’ve seen a newspaper run: The same U.S. Navy SEAL unit that killed Osama bin Laden parachuted into Somalia under cover of darkness early Wednesday and crept up to an outdoor camp where an American woman and Danish man were being held hostage. Soon, nine kidnappers were dead and both hostages were freed. The hostages, two aid workers who had been kidnapped three months earlier, were victims of an expanding land-based kidnapping enterprise engaged in by Somali pirates in response to the growing difficulty of hijacking ships in the Gulf of Aden. “The same U.S. Navy SEAL unit that killed Osama bin Laden,” of course, refers to the Navy’s Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), also known as SEAL Team Six, though as with all JSOC operations there were almost certainly representatives from other services involved as well (possibly Air Force aircraft, and certainly joint terminal attack controllers and pararescuemen from the Air Force special mission unit organic to JSOC). As with the bin Laden raid, it is worth noting that what sets this mission apart from any other JSOC or DEVGRU operation is not the fact that it took place, but the publicity it is receiving. Hostage rescue is a core component of JSOC’s special mission units’ capabilities, as are counterterrorism, direct action, and strategic reconnaissance. Further, the operational tempo for special operations units as a whole – both “white” and “black” (with JSOC falling in the latter category) – continues to be incredibly high, making this highly publicized mission just another one of hundreds being carried out around the world every month (according to ISAF, for example, 1,879 special operations raids were carried out in Afghanistan alone in the first eight months of 2011). Aside from results the raid itself – two hostages rescued unharmed, and nine heavily armed “tangoes” dead – part of the reason this mission is being so highly publicized is the high psychological importance of its success, a position which it holds for two main reasons. THE GHOSTS OF ‘BLACK HAWK DOWN’ Make no mistake: this raid, and its publicization, sends a powerful message about America’s willingness to put boots on the ground in Somalia nearly two decades after the withdrawal of US forces from that country in 1994. Though this mission neither took place in “Mog” (Mogadishu) nor in daylight, the success of JSOC’s effort will go a long way to exorcise the lingering demons of 1993′s ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident that left 18 American Rangers and Delta Force operators dead and many more wounded. This isn’t America’s first action in Somalia since then. As Bill Roggio notes , at least three direct action missions or campaigns have been carried out in Somalia in the last half-decade: First, US forces (CIA and special operations forces) are known to have engaged the Islamic Courts Union several times in late 2006 and early 2007 when the Ethiopians invaded Somalia in December 2006. Second, a US Navy warship and US personnel targeted al Qaeda leader Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in June 2007 off the coast of Somalia’s semi-autonomous region of Puntland. After the USS Chafee opened fire on their speedboats, 35 Islamic Courts fighters were killed. Third, US special operations forces killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in September 2009 during a daring helicopter raid in the southern Somali town of Barawe. Nabhan’s body was recovered during the raid. Additionally, at least nine drone strikes have been carried out between 2006 and the present month . However, there is no question that this is the highest-profile and most-publicized American mission to have taken place on Somali soil since our 1994 withdrawal, which convinced Osama bin Laden “that the American soldier was just a paper tiger.” As such, it sends a clear, if indirect, message that the lingering demons of the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident won’t prevent our forces from operating on the ground in Somalia if there is a mission there that needs to be done. BOUNCING BACK FROM THE TANGI TRAGEDY Though special operations forces conducted upward of 2,000 missions in Afghanistan alone in 2011, two JSOC missions in general – and DEVGRU missions in particular – made more headlines than all of the others combined. The first, both chronologically and in terms of overall attention, was the DEVGRU-led May 1 raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan that resulted in the death of the world’s most wanted terrorist, Osama bin Laden. The second, and more recent, was entirely different. On August 6, when entering an objective area to support a Ranger element on the ground, an Army National Guard CH-47 helicopter carrying JSOC operators, Afghan commandos, and an interpreter was shot down in the Tangi Valley in Wardak Province, eastern Afghanistan . Not only was it was the deadliest incident and deadliest day of the ten year war in Afghanistan, but the primary force on board was a troop from DEVGRU’s Gold Squadron – different operators than those who had carried out the Abbottabad raid, but members of the same SEAL Team. If the bin Laden raid had reaffirmed the legendary (some might say “mythic”) status of the Navy’s premier special mission unit, the Tangi Valley disaster acted as a chemical stripper to these commandos’ hard-earned and carefully crafted veneer of invincibility. Among the 38 killed in that crash were fifteen DEVGRU SEALs and three Air Force special tactics personnel – eighteen operators from Tier One units. Until last night, that tragedy had been the last highly publicized event involving JSOC in general, and SEAL Team Six in particular, despite hundreds of missions having been carried out between then and the present. Now, JSOC and DEVGRU are back on Americans’ radars for a positive reason. On the surface, last night’s successful rescue, which exemplifies the work that special operations forces do on a nightly basis, left nine pirates dead and put two hostages on the road home after a three month ordeal. Taking a wider view, though, this mission and the publicity it is receiving will go a long way toward exorcising the demons of Mogadishu 1993 and Tangi 2011 that have haunted the American psyche, for similar reasons but in differing amounts, ever since.
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A Successful Rescue in Somalia and a Psychological Lift for America
Canadian Al-Shabaab Commander Killed in Mogadishu
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Canadian Al-Shabaab Commander Killed in Mogadishu
Just another day for Christians living in Islamic lands. (CDN) - A mother of four was killed for her Christian faith on Jan. 7 on the outskirts of Mogadishu, Somalia by Islamic extremists from al Shabaab militia, a relative said. The relative, who requested anonymity, said Asha Mberwa, 36, was killed at 5:15 p.m. in Warbhigly village; the Islamic extremists from the insurgent group had arrested her outside her house the previous day at 8:30 a.m. She died when the militants cut her throat in front of villagers who came out of their homes as witnesses. She is survived by her children – ages 12, 8, 6 and 4 – and her husband, who was not home at the time she was apprehended. They had married in 1993. Her relative, whose location is also withheld for security reasons, said he had phoned her on Jan. 5 to try to make arrangements for moving her family out of the area. Al Shabaab extremists, who control large parts of Mogadishu, were able to monitor the conversation and confirm that she had become a Christian, he said. He told Compass by phone that Mberwa feared that she and her family members’ lives were threatened. “Asha had been receiving threatening messages” after al Shabaab monitored her previous communications with him, he said.
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Somalia: Al-Shabaab Islamists Slaughter Mother of Four For Being a Christian…
The Presidential Palace in Mogadishu, Somalia, continues to exist only because 6,000 African Union troops are assigned to guard it and nearby government buildings. Al Shabaab, the al Qaeda-linked rebel group. is the current “really bad guy,” as one aide official has explained while attempting to classify the many murderous gangs that proliferate that impoverished country. The Islamist Al Shabaab has been brought to the attention of the world not only because of its well-reported ambitions of taking over Somalia, but for its wider goals of jihad internationally. This Somali terrorist group and its allies controls a large portion of the capital, Mogadishu, and most of the rest of the country. In declaring its allegiance to al Qaeda, al Shabaab has gained a guarantee of world press attention. The actual number of al Shabaab fighters has been estimated by British military sources to be around 7,000. Of these about 3,000 are reportedly organized guerrillas and the rest act as local police for both civil and religious control. The recent bombing of the Muna Hotel in Mogadishu located near seaside less than a mile from the heavily fortified Presidential Palace was a favored meeting place for government officials and parliamentarians. Of the approximately thirty killed, six were officials. It was a carefully planned operation aimed at intimidating government supporters. To insure security before government forces could capture them, two of the attackers committed suicide by detonating their explosive vests. The coordination and unrestricted killing is the mark of typical al Shabaab fighting tactics that apparently have been influenced by various veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. While there is a tendency to view al Shabaab’s structure as a unified command, it is divided geographically into three relatively autonomous units, with the strongest in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia. Juba Valley, a long time hot bed of insurgency, represents a fourth group aligned with but not a member of al Shabaab. There is little evidence that al Shabaab has yet reached an operationally unified approach. On the contrary, there remains considerable disagreement tactically among the several elements based on clan and ideological differences. There is little sign of material support from al Qaeda, though its links with the Somali organization are strengthened by strictly personal relationships and frequent travel to and from Yemen. Money continues to flow into Somalia through the traditional hawala personal transfer system and with increasing international links to the Somali diaspora. Certain elements in the immigrant African and general Islamic community in the U.K. and U.S. find exciting the prospect of assisting what they envision as a “revolutionary” al Shabaab. There is, of course, considerable speculation over the money extorted through piracy and an al Shabaab connection. For the most part, however, there is a consensus in intelligence circles that the proceeds of piracy first pass through a clan hierarchy. The religious orientation of al Shabaab appears to be one of convenience. Although it embraces a form of Wahhabism that is Sunni derived, it applies this ideology as it finds convenient in order to accomplish its purpose of jihad and recruit followers. Local units of al Shabaab apply their own interpretation of Sharia law in the belief that they are both the true civil and religious authority. There have been reports, however, coming out of central Somalia of orthodox Sunnis banding together to counter al Shabaab’s drive to dominate the religious application. To create an effective buffer against Somali insurgency of all hues, it will be necessary to provide substantial and consistent aid to President Sheik Sharif Ahmed’s Transitional Federal Government. This means a program that will enable the TFG to offer the basic services that are the responsibility of all governments. Increasing the size of the African Union Force (AMISOM) to twice it current size to a total of 12,000 troops would allow the TFG at least to gain administrative and security control of Mogadishu from al Shabaab. There is the view, of course, that the divisions in the country have been exacerbated by Western recognition of the TFG and that such action should be shelved in favor of ” constructive disengagement .” This would be followed, in theory, by acceptance of an al Shabaab Islamist state “as long as it did not engage in violence or terrorism.” With al Shabaab seeking to rule through intimidation by the gun, there is no way to institute civil authority other than to surrender to or outfight them. The Somali terrorist group has announced through its bombings last July in Kampala, Uganda, that killed 76 innocent civilians that it was “just the beginning” (as al Shabaab put it in a statement) of the internationalization of its ambitions. The signs are clear that al Shabaab intends to expand its operations even while consolidating its domestic position. The Somalis of al Shabaab are descendants of those outlaws and murderers known for generations throughout Somalia and nearby regions as t’era-shifta . At various times in the recent past these shifta have sought to operate under the guise of political change. Nonetheless they continue today their ancient practice of robbing , maiming and killing indiscriminately while taking no prisoners except to enslave or sell them. It has been thus for hundreds of years — and remains so today. “Constructive disengagement” is not in their DNA.
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The Really Bad Guys
